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We analyze the least increment function, a convex function of n variables associated to
an n-person cooperative game. Another convex representation of cooperative games, the
indirect function, has previously been studied. At every point the least increment function
is greater than or equal to the indirect function, and both functions coincide in the case
of convex games, but an example shows that they do not necessarily coincide if the game
is totally balanced but not convex. We prove that the least increment function of a game
contains all the information of the game if and only if the game is totally balanced. We also
give necessary and suﬃcient conditions for a function to be the least increment function
of a game as well as an expression for the core of a game in terms of its least increment
function.
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1. Introduction
A cooperative game is a pair (N, v), where N = {1, . . . ,n} is a ﬁnite set and v : 2N → R is a function satisfying the
condition v(∅) = 0. Given a game (N, v) and a coalition S ⊆ N , the subgame (S, v) is obtained by restricting v to 2S . To
every coalition S ⊆ N is associated its characteristic vector 1S ∈ {0,1}n , where 1S(i) = 1 if i ∈ S , and 1S(i) = 0 if i /∈ S .
In view of economic applications, it is convenient to distinguish between proﬁt games and cost games. For a cost game
c : 2N → R and a proﬁt game v : 2N → R we deﬁne the polyhedra
P (c) = {x ∈ Rn: x(S) c(S) for all S ⊆ N},
P (v) = {x ∈ Rn: x(S) v(S) for all S ⊆ N},
C(c) = {x ∈ P (c): x(N) = c(N)},
C(v) = {x ∈ P (v): x(N) = v(N)},
where x(S) = 〈1S , x〉 =∑i∈S xi . Note that P (c) 	= ∅ if and only if c(∅) 0, and P (v) 	= ∅ if and only if v(∅) 0. Thus, the
polyhedra P (c) and P (v) associated to cost and proﬁt games c and v , respectively, are nonempty. The polyhedra C(c) and
C(v) are called the cores of the respective games. Games with a nonempty core are called balanced games. A game is totally
balanced if each subgame is balanced. A useful reference for these concepts is [5].
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N(C, x) = {x∗ ∈ Rn: 〈x∗, y − x〉 0 for all y ∈ C}
its normal cone at x ∈ Rn . Notice that if there are no supporting hyperplanes to C through x, then N(C, x) = {0}.
For a function ϕ : C ⊆ Rn → R, we consider the convex conjugate function ϕ∗ : Rn → R = R∪{±∞}, given by (see [6])
ϕ∗(x) = sup
x∗∈C
{〈
x∗, x
〉− ϕ(x∗)},
and its subdifferential at x ∈ C :
∂ f (x) = {x∗ ∈ Rn: f (y) − f (x) 〈x∗, y − x〉 for all y ∈ C}.
2. The indirect function
In this section we study a representation of n-person cooperative games by functions of n variables. As in [3], where
this representation was introduced, we shall restrict the presentation to proﬁt games; of course, a parallel theory can be
developed for cost games:
Deﬁnition 2.1. The indirect function of a proﬁt game v : 2N → R is the function πv : Rn → R given by πv (x) = max{v(S) −
x(S): S ⊆ N} for all x ∈ Rn .
The indirect function admits an economic interpretation. Let us regard the players of the proﬁt game as workers, and
v(S) as the proﬁt (measured in money units) that coalition S yields when its members work together, provided that they
have available the resources needed for production. Suppose that an employer, owning these resources, wishes to choose
those workers who would provide him with the maximum possible proﬁt. If the subset S is selected then the total amount
of money that S will yield is v(S). If x = (x1, . . . , xn) is the vector of (possibly negative) salaries demanded by the workers
then πv(x) represents the maximum net proﬁt the employer can obtain under those given salaries.
Theorem 2.1. Let v : 2N → R be a proﬁt game. Then, for all S ⊆ N, one has
v(S) = min{x(S) +πv(x): x ∈ Rn}. (1)
The importance of the preceding theorem lies in that it shows that the indirect function πv of a proﬁt game v contains
all the information on the game, as it allows to recover v from πv .
Indirect functions of proﬁt games are characterized in [3] by three properties, two of which are expressed in terms of
the convex analytic subdifferential:
Theorem 2.2. Let π : Rn → R. There exists a proﬁt game v : 2N → R such that π = πv if and only if π satisﬁes the following
properties:
(1) ∂π(x) ∩ {−1,0}n 	= ∅, for all x ∈ Rn.
(2) {−1,0}n ⊆⋃x∈Rn ∂π(x).
(3) min{π(x): x ∈ Rn} = 0.
Many concepts in the theory of cooperative proﬁt games can be easily expressed in terms of indirect functions; we refer
the reader for details to [3]. In particular, totally balanced (proﬁt) games, an important class of games that will be dealt
with in the subsequent sections, are characterized by their indirect functions in [4].
3. The least increment function
This section is devoted to a different way of representing proﬁt games by convex functions, namely, by the so-called least
increment functions. The interested reader can adapt this representation to the case of cost games.
Deﬁnition 3.1. The least increment function of a proﬁt game v : 2N → R is the function v : Rn → R, given by
v(x) = min
{
y(N) − x(N): y ∈ P (v), y  x}.
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reverse inclusion, suppose that v (x) = 0. Then ∑i∈N (yi − xi) = 0 for some y ∈ P (v) such that y  x, and hence x = y. This
establishes
−1v (0) = P (v).
The least increment function admits the following interpretation. Suppose that a payoff vector x ∈ Rn is offered to the
players. Then v(x) is the least amount y(N) − x(N) by which the total payoff x(N) should be incremented to make the
resulting payoff vector acceptable by all coalitions (y(S) v(S) for all S ⊆ N) and preferred to the initial one by all players
(y  x).
Example 3.1. Let ({1}, v) be a proﬁt game. By identifying v with v({1}), we get
v(x) = min{y − x: y  v and y  x} =min
{
y − x: y max{v, x}}
= min{y: y max{v, x}}− x = max{v, x} − x
=
{
v − x if x v,
0 if x v.
Proposition 3.1. The least increment function v of a proﬁt game (N, v) satisﬁes
v(x) = max
{∑
S⊆N
λS
[
v(S) − x(S)]: ∑
S⊆N
λS1S ∈ [0,1]n, {λS}S⊆N ∈ R2N+
}
. (2)
Proof. The duality theorem of linear programming implies
v(x) = min
{〈1N , y − x〉: y − x 0, 〈1S , y − x〉 v(S) − x(S), ∀S ⊆ N}
= max
{∑
S⊆N
λS
[
v(S) − x(S)]: ∑
S⊆N
λS1S  1N , {λS}S⊆N ∈ R2N+
}
. 
According to the preceding deﬁnition, the least increment function is the optimum value function of a parametric linear
programming problem. Using the duality theorem of linear programming, it easily follows that, like the indirect function,
the least increment function is a polyhedral convex function. The following proposition compares both functions.
Proposition 3.2. If v : 2N → R is a proﬁt game then, for all x ∈ Rn,
v(x) πv(x).
Proof. For each S ⊆ N and for each y ∈ P (v) such that y  x, we have
y(N) = y(S) + y(N \ S) v(S) + x(N \ S),
and therefore
min
{
y(N) − x(N): y ∈ P (v), y  x}max{v(S) − x(S): S ⊆ N}= πv(x). 
Example 3.2. Let us consider N = {1,2} and v : 2N → R given by v(∅) = 0, v({1}) = v1, v({2}) = v2, and v({1,2}) = v . We
consider at ﬁrst the case in which v1 + v2  v . For the polyhedron
P (v) = {y ∈ R2: y1  v1, y2  v2, y1 + y2  v}
there are the following boundary lines:
y1 = v1, y2 = v2, y1 + y2 = v.
Then there are two extreme points (v1, v − v1) and (v − v2, v2) of P (v). Furthermore, the core of v is the segment deﬁned
by these extreme points. Proposition 3.2 implies that
v(x) v1 − x1, v(x) v2 − x2, v(x) v − x1 − x2,
for all x = (x1, x2) ∈ R2. Taking suitable vectors in the boundary lines of P (v), we obtain
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⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
0 if x ∈ P (v),
v1 − x1 if x1  v1, x2  v − v1,
v2 − x2 if x1  v − v2, x2  v2,
v − x1 − x2 if x1  v − v2, x2  v − v1, x1 + x2  v.
In the case v1 + v2 > v , the only extreme point of P (v) is (v1, v2) and the core of v is empty. Then the least increment
function is given by
v(x) =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
0 if x ∈ P (v),
v1 − x1 if x1  v1, x2  v2,
v2 − x2 if x1  v1, x2  v2,
v1 + v2 − x1 − x2 if x1  v1, x2  v2.
Shapley [7] introduced convex (proﬁt) games as follows:
Deﬁnition 3.2. A proﬁt game v : 2N → R is called convex if
v(S ∪ T ) + v(S ∩ T ) v(S) + v(T )
for all S, T ⊆ N . A cost game c : 2N → R is concave if the reverse inequality holds.
Deﬁnition 3.3. The vector rank function of a concave cost game c : 2N → R is rc : Rn → R, given by rc(u) = min{c(S) +
u(N \ S): S ⊆ N}.
The function rc is related to P (c) by the min–max equation
rc(u) = max
{
x(N): x ∈ P (c), x u}, (3)
which is an immediate consequence of the following generalization of the intersection theorem for polymatroids due to
Edmonds [1]:
Theorem 3.3. For distributive lattices F1,F2 ⊆ 2N , let c1 :F1 → R, c2 :F2 → R be concave cost games. If there exists a set S ∈F1
such that N \ S ∈F2 , then we have
min
{
c1(S) + c2(N \ S): S ∈F1, N \ S ∈F2
}= max{x(N): x ∈ P (c1) ∩ P (c2)}.
Moreover, if c1 and c2 are integer valued, then the maximum is attained by an integral vector.
Proof. See Fujishige [2, Theorem 4.9]. 
We shall next give a suﬃcient condition for the inequality in Proposition 3.2 to hold with the equal sign.
Theorem 3.4. If v : 2N → R is a convex proﬁt game then v = πv .
Proof. The result follows from (3) applied to the concave cost game −v:
v(x) = min
{
y(N) − x(N): y ∈ P (v), y  x}
= min{y(N): y ∈ P (v), y  x}− x(N)
= min{y(N): −y ∈ P (−v), y  x}− x(N)
= −max{z(N): z ∈ P (−v), z−x}− x(N)
= −min{−v(S) − x(N \ S): S ⊆ N}− x(N)
= max{v(S) + x(N \ S): S ⊆ N}− x(N)
= max{v(S) − x(S): S ⊆ N}
= πv(x). 
A natural question to ask is whether the convexity assumption can be removed in the preceding theorem. In other words,
do the indirect function and the least increment function of any proﬁt game coincide? If this were the case, according to (1)
the expression min{x(S) + v(x): x ∈ Rn} would coincide with v(S) for any proﬁt game and any coalition S . However, from
the next theorem it follows that the equality v(S) = min{x(S) + v(x): x ∈ Rn} is characteristic of totally balanced proﬁt
games. We will use the Shapley–Bondareva characterization of this class of games (see, e.g., [5]), for which we ﬁrst need to
recall the notion of x-balanced collection:
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∑
T⊆N λT 1T = x.
Proposition 3.5 (Shapley–Bondareva). A proﬁt game v : 2N → R is totally balanced if for all S ∈ 2N and all 1S -balanced collection
{λT }T⊆N it satisﬁes∑T⊆N λT v(T ) v(S).
The class of totally balanced proﬁt games is closed under pointwise inﬁmum, that is, if {vi}i∈I is an arbitrary nonempty
family of totally balanced proﬁt games then the proﬁt game v : 2N → R deﬁned by v(S) = infi∈I vi(S) for all S ∈ 2N is totally
balanced, too. Besides, any proﬁt game v : 2N → R admits a totally balanced majorant, i.e., a totally balanced proﬁt game
w : 2N → R satisfying w(S) v(S) for all S ∈ 2N . Indeed, one can take, e.g., the (additive) game deﬁned by w(S) = k|S| for
all S ∈ 2N , with
kmax
{
v(S)
|S| : S ∈ 2
N \ {∅}
}
.
In view of these properties, the following concept is well deﬁned:
Deﬁnition 3.5. The totally balanced cover of a proﬁt game v : 2N → R is the proﬁt game v˜ : 2N → R deﬁned by
v˜(S) = inf{w(S): w : 2N → R is a totally balanced majorant of v}.
From this deﬁnition the following result immediately follows:
Proposition 3.6. The totally balanced cover v˜ : 2N → R of the proﬁt game v : 2N → R is the smallest (in the pointwise sense) totally
balanced majorant of v. Therefore, v is totally balanced if and only if v˜ = v.
The next proposition is well known [8, formula (4-4)] and easy to prove:
Proposition 3.7. The totally balanced cover v˜ : 2N → R of the proﬁt game v : 2N → R is given by
v˜(S) =max
{∑
T⊆N
λT v(T ):
∑
T⊆S
λT 1T = 1S , λT  0, ∀T ⊆ N
}
.
We are now in a position to state the theorem announced above:
Theorem 3.8. For any proﬁt game v : 2N → R, one has
v˜(S) =min{x(S) + v(x): x ∈ Rn} for all S ∈ 2N .
Proof. Let x ∈ Rn . We recall that
v(x) = min
{〈1N , z〉: z 0, z(T ) v(T ) − x(T ), ∀T ⊆ N}.
Then, for every coalition S ∈ 2N ,
min
{
x(S) + v(x): x ∈ Rn
}= min{〈1S , x〉 + 〈1N , z〉: x, z ∈ Rn, z 0, x(T ) + z(T ) v(T ), ∀T ⊆ N}
= max
{∑
T⊆N
λT v(T ):
∑
T⊆N
λT 1T = 1S ,
∑
T⊆N
λT 1T  1N , λT  0, ∀T ⊆ N
}
= max
{∑
T⊆N
λT v(T ):
∑
T⊆N
λT 1T = 1S , λT  0, ∀T ⊆ N
}
= max
{∑
T⊆N
λT v(T ):
∑
T⊆S
λT 1T = 1S , λT  0, ∀T ⊆ N
}
= v˜(S);
for the latter equality see Proposition 3.7. 
In view of Theorem 3.8, one can say that the least increment function provides a dual representation of totally balanced
proﬁt games. Indeed, unlike the indirect function, the least increment function of an arbitrary proﬁt game does not contain
all the information on the game, but only on its totally balanced cover, since one can prove that proﬁt games having the
same totally balanced cover have also the same least increment function.
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not generally coincide, they do in the case of totally balanced proﬁt games. However, the following example of a 4-players
totally balanced (but not convex, of course) proﬁt game shows that this conjecture is wrong.
Example 3.3. Let (N, v) be the proﬁt game given by N = {1,2,3,4} and
v(∅) = 0, v({i})= −2 for all i ∈ N, v({1,2})= v({2,3})= 1,
v
({1,3})= v({1,4})= v({2,4})= v({3,4})= −2, v({1,2,3})= 0,
v
({1,2,4})= −1, v({1,3,4})= 1, v({2,3,4})= −1, v(N) = 1.
We prove that this game is totally balanced, i.e., all the subgames (S, v S ) are balanced. Notice that v({i, j}) v({i})+ v({ j})
for all i 	= j, and hence the subgames (S, v S ) are convex and balanced for coalitions S such that |S| 2. Moreover,
if S = {1,2,3} then (x1, x2, x3) = (−1,2,−1) ∈ C(v S);
if S = {1,2,4} then (x1, x2, x4) = (0,1,−2) ∈ C(v S);
if S = {1,3,4} then (x1, x3, x4) = (1/3,1/3,1/3) ∈ C(v S);
if S = {2,3,4} then (x2, x3, x4) = (1,0,−2) ∈ C(v S);
if S = N then (x1, x2, x3, x4) = (3/2,0,3/2,−2) ∈ C(v).
The indirect function πv(0) = max{v(S): S ⊆ N} = 1. Proposition 3.1 implies
v(0) =max
{∑
S⊆N
λS v(S):
∑
S⊆N
λS1S  1N , λS  0 for all S ⊆ N
}
.
We consider the collection F = {{1,2}, {2,3}, {1,3,4}} and deﬁne
λS =
{
1/2 if S ∈F,
0 if S /∈F .
Since
∑
S⊆N λS1S = (1,1,1,1/2) 1N , we obtain
v(0)
∑
S∈F
λS v(S) = 3
2
.
In order to characterize least increment functions we will need the following lemma:
Lemma 3.9. Let C ⊂ Rn be a convex polyhedron with nonempty interior and let W ⊂ Rn \ {0} be such that N(C, x) ∩ W 	= ∅ for all
x ∈ bdC. Then there exist wi ∈ W and ri ∈ R, i = 1, . . . , p, such that
C = {x ∈ Rn: 〈x,wi〉 ri, i = 1, . . . , p}.
Proof. Let 〈x, x∗i 〉 bi , i = 1, . . . , p, be a minimal system representing C , that is,
C = {x ∈ Rn: 〈x, x∗i 〉 bi, i = 1, . . . , p}
and
C 	= {x ∈ Rn: 〈x, x∗i 〉 bi, i ∈ I}
if I is a proper subset of {1, . . . , p}. Let Hi = {x ∈ Rn: 〈x, x∗i 〉  bi}, i = 1, . . . , p. Let i ∈ {1, . . . , p}. We have
⋂
j 	=i int H j 
int Hi , since otherwise we would have
⋂
j 	=i H j = cl int
⋂
j 	=i H j = cl
⋂
j 	=i int H j ⊆ cl int Hi = Hi and hence C =
⋂p
j=1 H j =⋂
j 	=i H j , which is a contradiction with the minimality of the representation of C . Thus there exists xi ∈ Rn such that〈xi, x∗j 〉 < bi for all j 	= i and 〈xi, x∗i 〉  bi . Since C has a nonempty interior, without loss of generality we can assume
that 〈xi, x∗i 〉 = bi . Then xi ∈ bd C . Let c ∈ N(C, xi) \ {0} and d ∈ Rn be such that 〈d, x∗i 〉 = 0. For suﬃciently small λ ∈ R,
λ〈d, x∗j 〉 < bi −〈xi, x∗j 〉 and hence xi +λd ∈ C . Therefore λ〈d, c〉 0, which implies that 〈d, c〉 = 0. It thus follows that c = αx∗i
for some α ∈ R \ {0}. Given that xi − βx∗i ∈ C for small enough β > 0, we have 0 〈−βx∗i , c〉 = 〈−βx∗i ,αx∗i 〉 = −βα‖x∗i ‖2, so
that α > 0. We have thus proved that N(C, xi) is the cone generated by x∗i , so that γi x
∗
i ∈ W for some γi > 0. The statement
follows by setting wi = γi x∗i and ri = γibi . 
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properties:
1. ∂(x) ∩ [−1,0]n 	= ∅, for all x ∈ Rn.
2. [−1,0]n ⊆⋃x∈−1(0) ∂(x).
3. min{(x): x ∈ Rn} = 0.
4. int −1(0) 	= ∅.
5. N(−1(0), x) ∩ ({−1,0}n \ {0}) 	= ∅, for all x ∈ bd−1(0).
Among the games v satisfying  = v there is exactly one that is totally balanced, namely, the one deﬁned by
v(S) =min{(x) + x(S): x ∈ Rn}=min{x(S): x ∈ −1(0)}.
Proof. Let us ﬁrst assume that  = v for some game v . Let x ∈ Rn . Then there exist nonnegative coeﬃcients {λS}S⊆N with∑
S⊆N λS1S ∈ [0,1]n such that the maximum in (2) is attained. For every y ∈ Rn we have
(y)
∑
S⊆N
λS
[
v(S) − y(S)]= ∑
S⊆N
λS
[
v(S) − x(S)]+ ∑
S⊆N
λS
[
x(S) − y(S)]= (x) + 〈−∑
S⊆N
λS1S , y − x
〉
.
Thus −∑S⊆N λS1S ∈ ∂(x), and this proves property 1.
To prove property 2, we deﬁne ϕ : [−1,0]n → R by
ϕ
(
x∗
)=max{〈x∗, y〉: y ∈ P (v)}.
For every x ∈ Rn we have
ϕ∗(x) = max
x∗∈[−1,0]n
{〈
x∗, x
〉− ϕ(x∗)}
= max
x∗∈[−1,0]n
{〈
x∗, x
〉−max{〈x∗, y〉: y ∈ P (v)}}
= max
x∗∈[−1,0]n
{〈
x∗, x
〉+min{〈−x∗, y〉: y ∈ P (v)}}.
From linear programming duality it follows that
min
{〈−x∗, y〉: y ∈ P (v)}= max{∑
S⊆N
λS v(S):
∑
S⊆N
λS1S = −x∗, λS  0, ∀S ⊆ N
}
.
Thus, by using Proposition 3.1, we have
ϕ∗(x) = max
x∗∈[−1,0]n
{
max
{∑
S⊆N
λS v(S) +
〈
x∗, x
〉
:
∑
S⊆N
λS1S = −x∗, {λS}S⊆N ∈ R2N+
}}
= max
x∗∈[−1,0]n
{
max
{∑
S⊆N
λS
[
v(S) − x(S)]: ∑
S⊆N
λS1S = −x∗, {λS}S⊆N ∈ R2N+
}}
= max
{∑
S⊆N
λS
[
v(S) − x(S)]: ∑
S⊆N
λS1S ∈ [0,1]n, {λS}S⊆N ∈ R2N+
}
= (x).
Let x∗ ∈ [−1,0]n . Since ϕ is convex, proper and lower semicontinuous, we have ∗(x∗) = ϕ∗∗(x∗) = ϕ(x∗) = 〈x∗, y〉 for some
y ∈ P (v) = −1(0), and hence〈
x∗, y
〉

〈
x, x∗
〉− (x) for all x ∈ Rn.
This inequality and (y) = 0 imply
(x) − (y) 〈x∗, x− y〉 for all x ∈ Rn.
Consequently x∗ ∈ ∂(y), which proves property 2.
Since  is nonnegative and takes the value 0 on the nonempty set P (v), we obtain property 3.
Properties 4 and 5 are immediate consequences of the equality −1(0) = P (v).
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v(S) = −∗(−1S) = inf
x∈Rn
{
x(S) + (x)}.
For every S ⊆ N , we have −1S ∈ [−1,0]n . By property 2 there exists y ∈ −1(0) such that −1S ∈ ∂(y). Thus
(x) − (y) 〈−1S , x− y〉 for all x ∈ Rn,
which is equivalent to
x(S) + (x) y(S) for all x ∈ Rn.
Therefore, for every S ⊆ N , we obtain
v(S) = min
x∈Rn
{
x(S) + (x)}= min{x(S): x ∈ −1(0)}. (4)
Since v is the minimum game of a collection of additive games, we deduce that v is totally balanced. Notice also that for
every x∗ ∈ [−1,0]n , property 2 implies the existence of x ∈ −1(0) such that
(y)
〈
x∗, y − x〉 for all y ∈ Rn.
This proves that
∗
(
x∗
)= sup
y∈Rn
{〈
x∗, y
〉− (y)}= max
x∈−1(0)
〈
x∗, x
〉
, (5)
for all x∗ ∈ [−1,0]n .
Let x ∈ Rn . We show that
(x) = max
x∗∈[−1,0]n
{〈
x∗, x
〉− ∗(x∗)}. (6)
By deﬁnition ∗(x∗) 〈x∗, x〉 − (x) for all x∗ ∈ Rn , and hence
(x)
〈
x∗, x
〉− ∗(x∗) for all x∗ ∈ Rn. (7)
It follows from property 1 that there exists x∗0 ∈ [−1,0]n such that x∗0 ∈ ∂(x). Then (x) 〈x∗0, x− y〉 + (y) for all y ∈ Rn ,
which implies
(x)
〈
x∗0, x
〉− 〈x∗0, y〉 for all y ∈ −1(0),
and therefore, by (5), (x) 〈x∗0, x〉 − ∗(x∗0), which, in view of (7), proves (6).
We will next prove that −1(0) = P (v). Since  is a convex (by property 1) and continuous function (as it is a ﬁnite-
valued), by property 3 the set −1(0) is closed and convex. Moreover, by (4), −1(0) ⊆ P (v). To prove the reverse inclusion,
suppose x /∈ −1(0). Consequently, (x) > 0 and therefore, by properties 4 and 5 and Lemma 3.9, there exists S ⊆ N such
that 〈−1S , y〉 < 〈−1S , x〉 for all y ∈ −1(0). Since
∗(−1S) = max
y∈−1(0)
〈−1S , y〉 < −x(S),
we obtain v(S) = −∗(−1S ) > x(S) and hence x /∈ P (v). Thus, −1(0) = P (v) is proved. Combining this equality with linear
programming duality, we get
∗
(
x∗
)=max{〈x∗, y〉: y ∈ −1(0)}
=max{〈x∗, y〉: y ∈ P (v)}
=max{〈x∗, y〉: −y(S)−v(S), ∀S ⊆ N}
=min
{
−
∑
S⊆N
λS v(S): −
∑
S⊆N
λS1S = x∗, {λS}S⊆N ∈ R2N+
}
for all x∗ ∈ [−1,0]n . Thus, inserting the above into (3) yields
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x∗∈[−1,0]n
{〈
x∗, x
〉−min{−∑
S⊆N
λS v(S): −
∑
S⊆N
λS1S = x∗, {λS}S⊆N ∈ R2N+
}}
=max
{〈
x∗, x
〉+ ∑
S⊆N
λS v(S): −
∑
S⊆N
λS1S = x∗ ∈ [−1,0]n, {λS}S⊆N ∈ R2N+
}
=max
{〈
−
∑
S⊆N
λS1S , x
〉
+
∑
S⊆N
λS v(S):
∑
S⊆N
λS1S ∈ [0,1]n, {λS}S⊆N ∈ R2N+
}
=max
{∑
S⊆N
λS
[
v(S) − x(S)]: ∑
S⊆N
λS1S ∈ [0,1]n, {λS}S⊆N ∈ R2N+
}
for all x ∈ Rn . Therefore, Proposition 3.1 implies that  = v .
It only remains to prove the uniqueness of a totally balanced game satisfying  = v . This follows from the fact that
every totally balanced game is the minimum game of the collection of additive majorants, that is,
v(S) =min{x(S): x ∈ P (v)}= min{x(S): x ∈ −1(0)}
for all S ⊆ N , as this shows that v is determined by its least increment function  . 
We end this section by showing how the core of a proﬁt game can be expressed in terms of its least increment function.
Proposition 3.11. Let v : 2N → R be a balanced proﬁt game. Then
C(v) = {x ∈ Rn: {−1N ,0} ⊆ ∂v(x)}.
Proof. Suppose x ∈ C(v). Then x ∈ P (v) = −1v (0) and hence
v(y) − v(x) = v(y) 0 for all y ∈ Rn.
This gives 0 ∈ ∂v (x). Moreover, x(N) − y(N) = v(N) − y(N) z(N) − y(N) for all y ∈ Rn and z ∈ P (v). Since
v(y) = min
{
z(N) − y(N): z ∈ P (v), z y}
for all y ∈ Rn , we obtain
x(N) − y(N) v(y) for all y ∈ Rn.
Thus v (y) − v(x) 〈−1N , y − x〉 for all y ∈ Rn and hence −1N ∈ ∂v(x).
In order to prove the reverse inclusion, suppose 0 ∈ ∂v (x). Then, by Theorem 3.10,
v(x) = min
{
v(y): y ∈ Rn
}= 0.
Hence x ∈ −1v (0) = P (v). Now, if −1N ∈ ∂v (x) then, taking y ∈ C(v) ⊂ P (v) = −1v (0), we have 0 = v (y) x(N) − y(N)
v(N) − y(N) = 0. We thus obtain x(N) = y(N) = v(N), so that x ∈ C(v). 
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